Browsing by Author "Rahul Kumar Maurya"

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From Kantian enlightenment to Rortyan rights: A pragmatist perspective
(Taylor and Francis, 2025) Rahul Kumar Maurya
This chapter aims at examining what really constitutes the eighteenth century Enlightenment Project? How reason, truth, and freedom are intertwined with each other and play the bedrock of Platonic and Kantian Enlightenment? For the Enlightenment, the reason has been capable of unravelling the deeper human nature which in turn frees us, the human beings from their embeddedness to the concrete and contingent situations. The 18th century Enlightenment project was to ensure human beings' confidence in themselves concerning matters of public importance. Its aim was to place the human being's confidence in reason in order to think for themselves and free them from the self-incurred immaturity. The emphasis of the enlightenment's project was to secure reason a central place which is endowed with a capacity to fathom a universal human nature and thus guaranteeing freedom to human beings. The attempt will be made to understand whether the Kantian Enlightenment has been able to achieve its proclaimed goal or if it has failed. Many modern philosophers further see the advent of human rights from the Kantian Enlightenment project as if human rights are just a part of the extended culture of the enlightenment. Here I would like to bring in Richard Rorty who sees that the Enlightenment Project has failed to achieve what it has prophesied. It could not overcome the Platonic universal forms, something which have been transcendental in nature. For Rorty the Enlightenment could not break away from the shadow of religion which it had struggled against. Finally, the chapter will attempt to examine whether the enlightenment's goal can be achieved through invoking sentimentality rather than by knowing deeper human nature and universal moral principles. For him human rights can best be viewed as nothing but the summarisation from the given cultures and not from the given fixed human nature. © 2026 selection and editorial matter, Vishnu Varatharajan, Meera Chakravorty and Mbuh Tennu Mbuh.
Revisiting Rorty's Notion of Truth
(Brill Academic Publishers, 2021) Rahul Kumar Maurya
This paper is intended to explore the Rorty's notion of truth and its vicinity and divergences with Putnam's notion of truth. Rorty and Putnam, both the philosophers have developed their notion of truth against the traditional representational notion of truth but their strength lies in its distinctive characterization. For Putnam, truth is the property of a statement which cannot be lost but the justification of it could be. I will also examine the importance of Putnam's idealized justificatory conditions without which he may succumb to the charge of relativism at the same time how does Putnam overcome the tension between metaphysical and relativistic stances of truth. For Rorty, truth is not representational rather it is social, which means the justification for a true belief is not external but internal to the community of believers. I would further examine how Rorty tries to dispel the charge of relativism which is hard to overcome. Finally, I shall try to defend the concept of truth which is free from metaphysical baggage and relativistic threats; and in this enterprise Rorty walks half the way and Putnam completes the journey. © Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2021